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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Tiffany Dee Razon timely appeals from the district court's orders revoking
probation. On appeal, Ms. Razon argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various
transcripts she requested to be created at the public's expense. Ms. Razon also argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the length
of her sentences upon revoking probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 39627 (hereinafter, older case), Ms. Razon was charged, by
Information, with possession of a controlled substance and forgery.

(R., pp.61-62.)

Ms. Razon pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, and the State
dismissed the remaining charge. (R., pp.124.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.147152.) Upon review of Ms. Razon's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the
district court suspended the sentence and placed her on probation. (R., pp.163-168.)
In docket number 39628 (hereinafter, new case), Ms. Razon was charged, by
Information, with possession of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.393-394.)

This new

charge was also submitted to the district court as a probation violation in the older case.
(R., p.393-393, 216-220.)

In addition to the new charge, the State also alleged that

Ms. Razon violated various terms of her probation in the older case. (R., pp. 189-197,
216-220.) In the older case, Ms. Razon admitted to violating the terms of her probation
for not reporting to her probation officer, by absconding supervision, by being
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discharged from counseling, for failing to submit to substance testing, for changing her
residence without permission, for failing top complete community service, failing to wear
an ankle monitor, and for using a controlled substance. (R., pp.190-191, 230.) In the
newer case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Razon pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance. (R., ppAOO-409, 415.)
At a global sentencing/probation disposition hearing, the district court revoked
probation in the older case and imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three
years fixed in the newer case. (R., pp.224-228, 414-419.)

The district court ordered

the sentences to run concurrently, and it retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.224-228, 414-

419.) Upon review of Ms. Razon's rider, the district court suspended the sentences and
placed her on probation. (R., pp.233-238, 430-435.)
After a period of probation, the State filed two separate reports of probation
violation and two separate motions to revoke probation in each case, wherein the State
alleged that Ms. Razon violated various terms of her probation. (R., pp.244-250, 287291, 452-458, 492-496.) At a consolidated hearing, Ms. Razon admitted to violating the
terms of her probation for using methamphetamine on two occasions and for being
discharged from substance addiction treatment. 1 (R., pp. 244-250, 287-291, 319, 452458, 492-496, 524.)

The district court then revoked probation in both cases.

(R., pp.330-333, 536-539.) Ms. Razon timely appealed in both cases. (R., pp.336-338,
542-544.)

1 The State filed separate criminal charges based on the same actions which lead to the
probation violations in the newer and older cases. It appears that Ms. Razon previously
pleaded guilty to those charges and was sentenced in that case at this hearing.
(12/19/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-19.) However, Ms. Razon did not appeal from the judgment
of conviction in that matter. (12/19/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-19.)
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On appeal, Ms. Razon's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with transcripts of the entry of plea hearing, held on July 24, 2006 (Docket number
39627), the sentencing hearing, held on September 18, 2006 (Docket number 39627),
the rider review hearing, held on March 7,2007 (Docket number 39627), the evidentiary
hearing, held on April 21, 2009 (Docket number 39627), the rider review hearing, held
on October 14, 2009 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628), the admit/deny probation
violation hearing held on July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628), and the
entry of plea hearing held on April 20, 2009 (Docket number 39628), and to suspend the
briefing schedule pending preparation of the requested transcripts. (Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter,
Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.)

The State objected to Ms. Razon's request for the

transcripts of all the hearings except the admit/deny probation violation hearing held on
July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628).

(Objection in Part to "Motion to

Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof"
(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme

Court entered an order granting Ms. Razon's request for a transcript of the admit/deny
probation violation hearing held on July 26, 2011 (Docket numbers 39627 and 39628),
but denied her request for the other transcripts.
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)
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(Order, (hereinafter, Order Denying

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Razon due process and equal protection
when it denied her Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the
length of Ms. Razon's sentences upon revoking probation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Razon Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Ms. Razon filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various transcripts.
With the exception of one transcript, all of those requests were denied by the Supreme
Court. On appeal, Ms. Razon is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of her
request for the transcripts.

Ms. Razon asserts that the requested transcripts are

relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying her request.

5

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Razon Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The
Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Razon With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process
And Equal Protection Because She Cannot Obtain A Merit Based
Appellate Review Of Her Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CaNST.
art. I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998».

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
that transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a).
Idaho court rules also address this issue.

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the

production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..

. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appe"ate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants who have a statutory right to an appeal can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of "Iinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in a" other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." !d. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." !d.
In Draper v. State, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." !d. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29,34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
10

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's) claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed) that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Ms. Razon fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Ms. Razon's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone which prevents her from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceeding were before the district court
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see a/so State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
11

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made its
sentencing determinations.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point this
12

case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Ms. Razon is challenging the
length of her sentence, which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing
rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made
appropriate sentencing determinations.

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2
Further support for Ms. Razon's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery

2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal."
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Ms. Razon is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.

13

in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id. The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a transcript
of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original sentence was not on
appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error.
Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before
the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.

It appears that the

Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense. Had Ms. Razon failed to request the transcripts at issue,
the Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's
decision to execute the original sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
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proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Ms. Razon's request for the transcripts
will render her appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Ms. Razon's appellate sentencing claims on the merits,
and therefore, Ms. Razon should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Razon With Access
To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Her Due Process Because
She Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[t01 hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
15

Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Ms. Razon has not obtained
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
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Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . ., Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-S.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Ms. Razon on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Ms. Razon is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Ms. Free her constitutional
right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this
appeal.

Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the

requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Ms. Razon's
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Ms. Razon asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentences of six
years, with two years fixed, and six years, with'three years fixed, are excessive. Due to
the district court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence
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sua sponte upon the revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the
length of the sentence as being excessive.

State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944

(Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of
the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Razon does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Ms. Razon must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria, or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Ms.

Razon's

sentences are excessively harsh.

Specifically,

Ms. Razon's progress toward earning her GED is a mitigating factor. Ms. Razon was
scheduled to complete her GED in January of 2012.

(12/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.20-25.)

Ms. Razon had also earned a scholarship which would cover the costs of two GED
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tests. (Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, p.3l She needs to pass only one more
test to obtain her GED. (Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, p.18.)
Additionally, Ms. Razon's community and family based support are mitigating
factors. Ms. Razon has strong support from her mother and her brother, both of whom
wrote support letters prior to sentencing.
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.8-9.15-1?)

(Presentence Investigation

Report

At the probation violation disposition hearing,

Ms. Razon's trial counsel indicated the Ms. Razon "has a wonderful support group."
(12/19/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16.) Ms. Razon had a bed available to her at the Jubilee
House and attended treatment programs prior to the disposition hearing.

(12/19/11

Tr., p.12, Ls.13-25.)
Additionally, Ms. Razon's difficult childhood and the negative impact it had on her
mental health are mitigating factors. When Ms. Razon was ten years old she watched
her father, who suffered from pancreatic cancer, while he was dying on her parent's
bathroom floor.

(Part I Updated Sentencing Materials, pp.13, 28.)

Her father was

revived, rushed to the hospital, but pronounced dead upon his arrival. (Part I Updated
Sentencing Materials, p.28.)
Ms. Razon suffers from depression and anxiety and was admitted into a mental
health facility when she was either thirteen of fourteen years old.

(PSI, p.12; (Part I

Updated Sentencing Materials, pp.31-35.) Ms. Razon attributed this depression to the

There were various sentencing materials considered by the district court at the
December 19, 2011, probation violation disposition hearing, which were not included in
the record on appeal. (12/19/11 Tr., p.5, L.12 - p.?, L.1.) Accordingly, a motion to
augment has been filed concurrently herewith. Moreover, the exhibits were sent to
appellate counsel's office as a facsimile in two parts and each part contains pagination
in the upper right hand corner. For ease of citation, this brief will adhere to that
pagination. Part I begins on page three and ends on page forty three. Part" begins on
page one and ends on page thirty six.
3
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death of her father. (PSI, pp.8-9, 12-13.) After her father died, Ms. Razon was raped
when she was twelve years old. (PSI, pp.8, 15.) She ran away from home as a means
to cope with those tragic experiences. (Part II Updated Sentencing Materials, p.15.) In
2007 she was admitted to a care center for depression and suicidal ideation. (Part I
Updated Sentencing Materials, p.16.)

She also suffers from panic attacks.

(Part II

Updated Sentencing Materials, p.7.)
Further, Ms. Razon's substance addiction is a mitigating factor. While Ms. Razon
was diagnosed as dependent on nicotine and methamphetamine, she was only
recommended for outpatient treatment.

(PSI, pp.67, 80.)

In her 2011 substance

addiction evaluation, she was also diagnosed as dependant on amphetamine, but
received a recommendation for intensive outpatient treatment.

(Part II Updated

Sentencing Materials, p.36.)
Finally, Ms. Razon's positive rider performance is a mitigating factor. While on
her first rider, Ms. Razon completed all of her programming and also "completed 28 selfstudy lessons, attended 41 church services, participated in yoga, attended 23
Alcoholics/Narcotics/Cocaine Anonymous meetings, and volunteered 132 hours to the
facility." (PSI, p.36.) Ms. Razon was considered a hard worker with a positive attitude.
(PSI, p.37.) While on her second rider, Ms Razon also "attended 9 ANNA meetings[,]
24 church services[,] and donated 12 hours of volunteer service to this facility." (PSI,
p.52.)
In sum, the mitigating factors present in this matter support the conclusion that
the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the length of
her sentences upon revoking probation.

20

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Ms. Razon

respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the fixed portion of her
sentence, in docket number 39627, from three to two years. Alternatively, Ms. Razon
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of her sentences as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this

ih day of September, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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